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Abstract
The article discusses the narratives of  “Islamist” intolerance in two cities 
of  Yogyakarta and Solo in the post-Suharto era. It aims to elucidate the 
multiplicity of  intolerance acts and the complexity of  underpinning factors to 
intolerance. It argues that Islamist intolerance has manifested in various forms, 
ranging from the ideological, instrumental, and symbolic form. However, these 
categorizations of  ideological, instrumental, and symbolic are not clear-cut 
and permanent one, but there is always some possible overlap between them. 
There is also the possibility that the form of  intolerance can change in different 
times and occasions. This study is based on fieldwork research taken during 
2014-2016 in both cities. Methodologically, this research-based article used 
Extended Cased Method (ECM). The data was collected by employing in-
depth interview and participant observation with secondary sources such as 
local media and government documents.
[Tulisan ini membahas narasi Islam intoleran di dua kota, Solo dan 
Yogyakarta, pasca rezim Soeharto. Selain itu juga menjelaskan sejumlah aksi 
intoleran dan kompleksitas faktor-faktor yang berkelindan didalam peristiwa 
tersebut. Tulisan ini mengajukan argumen bahwa Islam intoleran mempunyai 
1 Thanks to Syahrul Hidayat, Rochdi Mohan, Fachri Aidulsyah, and Rizky Alif  
for their contribution in the process of  data collection and discussion. Also, thanks 
to the Faculty of  Social and Political Science of  Gadjah Mada University for research 
grant that enable to conduct this research.  
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ragam bentuk, mulai dari ideologis, instrumentalis hingga simbolis. Meskipun 
demikian, kategori tersebut tidak bersifat kaku dan permanen, tetapi 
terkadang bersifat saling overlap satu sama lainnya. Ada kemungkinan juga 
bentuk intoleran berubah seiring dengan perubahan waktu dan kondisi. Kajian 
ini berdasarkan pada studi lapangan di dua kota pada rentang waktu 2014 
– 2016. Secara metodologi kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan Extended 
Cased Method (ECM). Data dikumpulkan melalui serangkaian wawancara 
mendalam dan observasi partisipatif  dengan didukung data sekunder dari 
arsip daerah dan sejumlah media surat kabar lokal.] 
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A. Introduction
This paper is based on comparative research in Yogyakarta and 
Solo with the main focus on the resurgence of  Islamist intolerance in 
both cities. Major existent researches on Islamist intolerance employ 
actors and networks approach,2 or structural explanation related the 
development of  democratization in post Suharto.3 Within this frame, 
2 M. Najib Azca, “After Jihad: a Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics 
in Indonesia”, Ph.D Dissertation (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2011); 
Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of  Islam (Sydney: University 
of  New South Wales Press, 2004); Martin Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of  Islamic 
Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, vol. 10, no. 2 (2002), 
pp. 117–54; Martin Van Bruinessen, Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: 
Explaining the “Conservative Turn” (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 
2013); Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in 
Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008); Vedi R. Hadiz, 
“Towards a Sociological Understanding of  Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia”, Journal 
of  Contemporary Asia, vol. 38, no. 4 (2008), pp. 638–47; Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: 
Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca N.Y.: Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006); Haedar 
Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia (Jakarta: PSAP, 
2007); John Thayer Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006).
3 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State the Islamization of  Law in Modern Indonesia 
(Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 2008); Gerry van Klinken, Communal Violence 
and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars (New York: Routledge, 2007); Luthfi 
Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2009); Greg Barton, “Islamic Liberalism and the Prospect for Democracy 
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intolerance acts frequently viewed as either a matter of  political identity or 
a manifestation of  contested social (and political) sphere in democratizing 
Indonesia post-Suharto.
Choosing a different approach, this paper attempts to elucidate 
multiplicity of  intolerance acts as well as the complexity of  underpinning 
factors to intolerance. It starts by discussing the different trajectory 
of  the political and historical process in Yogyakarta and Solo that has 
resulted in different forms of  public expression as well as the degree of  
tension regarding Islamist intolerance. This article argues that intolerance 
manifested in various forms and driven by a variety of  force ranging 
from ideological, instrumental, and symbolic factors. It should be noted 
that these categorizations of  symbolic, instrumental, and ideological are 
not clear-cut and permanent one but there are some possible overlaps 
between one and another and may shift over different times and 
occasions. The link and the interlink between three different kinds of  
intolerance in both cities will be discussed in the latter part of  the paper 
followed by the conclusion. 
Methodologically, this research employs the extended case method 
(ECM) of  Burawoy.4 It emphasizes reflexivity that raises the possibility 
of  dialogue and the premise of  inter-subjectivity between participant(s) 
and observer(s).5 It also enables a particular case to be extended beyond 
the locality, region, and even nation to the globe through reconstructing 
in Indonesia”, in Democracy in Asia, ed. by Michele Schmiegelow (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997), pp. 427–53; Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of  Jemaah 
Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008); Masdar 
Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: Institute of  
Southeast Asian Studies, 2010); Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in 
the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2009); Saiful 
Mujani, Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di Indonesia Pasca 
Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007); Ariel Heryanto, State Terrorism 
and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging (New York: Routledge, 2006); Hakimul 
Ikhwan, “Democratic Islamism: Islamists Engagement with Democratic Politics in 
Post Suharto Indonesia”, Ph.D Dissertation (Colchester: University of  Essex, 2015).
4 Stephen Gilbert Brown and Sidney I. Dobrin (eds.), Ethnography Unbound: 
Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
1991); Michael Burawoy, The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four 
Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition (Berkeley: University of  California 
Press, 2009).
5 Michael Burawoy, The Extended Case Method.
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pre-existing theory and engaging theory with data and theory with other 
theories. Meanwhile, the data collection technique combines in-depth 
interview and participant observation with secondary sources such 
as local media and government documents. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with the diverse social groups in both cities, ranging from 
Islamist organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which 
concern on pluralism and tolerance, and influential local figures. The total 
numbers of  successful in-depth interviews and participant observations 
were twelve and thirteen respectively.
The article will begin with a brief  overview of  Yogyakarta and 
Solo. Then, it will elaborate three different kinds of  intolerance actions 
and their link to the difference of  predominant hegemonic power in the 
respective cities. It follows by a discussion on the link and the interlink 
of  three forms of  intolerance in both cities.                                                             
B. Twin Kingdoms, Different Fates: A Historical Overview 
This section will provide a brief  overview of  socio-historical and 
political trajectory in order to see the link between intolerance actions 
and power relations that dominated fields of  politics, economic, social, 
and cultural in the two royal cities of  Yogyakarta and Solo. It will start 
by narrating that Yogyakarta and Solo have long historical roots in the 
history of  Islamic Mataram Kingdom as one of  the most prominent 
Islamic-Javanese Kingdom in Nusantara.6
The separation of  the two Kingdoms occurred after decades 
of  internal war following conflict for the throne between the Prince 
of  Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana III. The conflict forced the two 
groups into an agreement, which so-called the Giyanti Agreement in 
1755. The Agreement finally divided the Mataram into two Kingdoms, 
namely the Kasunanan of  Surakarta under the Pakubuwana III and 
Kasultanan Ngayogyakarta under the Prince of  Mangkubumi, which 
latter titled Hamengkubuwono I. The Kingdom separation, however, 
continued in a later period when the Kasunanan had to witness the 
establishment of  a new Kingdom of  Mangkunegaran. Meanwhile, the 
Kasultanan Ngayogyakarta had also broken up by the establishment of  
6 An ancient name for a territory that used to cover major archipelago in the 
Southeastern Asia
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the Pakualaman led by Prince of  Natakusuma, a son of  Hamengkubowo 
I.7 The Giyanti Agreement had demonstrated the role of  colonial Dutch 
in the separation of  the Kingdom. Indeed, after the Giyanti Agreement, 
the Dutch was getting stronger and more influential across the Javanese 
land where the power of  Mataram-related Kingdoms was substantially 
reduced.8 In this regard, for the sake of  securing political power and 
economic interest, it was obvious that the Kingdoms tend to become 
simply local ‘collaborators’ of  the Dutch in favour of  colonialization in 
Java.9
Despite relatively similar pathways between the kingdom of  
Yogyakarta and Solo in the colonial era, the development in post-
colonial Indonesia seemed to bring different fates for the two cities. 
The Kasultanan of  Ngayogyakarta took the immediate initiative in 
the aftermath of  Indonesian declaration of  independence to support 
the newly established Republic through the employment of  various 
possible means. The Kasultanan led by a young and smart Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX (HB IX) had clearly stated a notion of  support 
for the Republic in the so-called ‘September 5th Mandate Letter’, which 
stated that the Yogyakarta Kingdom is an integral part of  Republic of  
Indonesia.10 Moreover, a distinct leadership quality was also shown by 
the Sultan HB IX when, for the sake of  the survival of  the new Republic 
during the early independence, he allowed Yogyakarta to be a temporary 
capital city for Indonesia since the Capital Jakarta was considered as 
unsafe. Not only was the Sultan facilitating a shift of  the capital but 
also he provided the Keraton’s cash reserves to financing Indonesia’s 
officer salary for four months consecutively. In addition, he was also 
regarded as a mastermind behind the ‘6 hours military operation’ in 
Yogyakarta demonstrating to the international communities that the 
7 Selo Soemardjan, Perubahan Sosial di Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada 
University Press, 1981).
8 Ibid., p. 23.
9 J.J. van Klaveren, The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies (Dordrecht: Springer, 
1983); Keat Gin Ooi, Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East 
Timor (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004); Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of  Asian 
Autonomies: Responses to modernity in the diverse states of  Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1900 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997).
10 Mark Woodward, Java, Indonesia and Islam (New York: Springer, 2010).
30 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2019 M/1440 H
Muhammad Najib Azca et al.
republic remained to exist.11 Given all these contributions to the Republic, 
Yogyakarta has been honoured with a special autonomy where one of  
the privileges is that the governor is not elected by the people but rather 
appointed Sultan. This status of  special autonomy has been again affirmed 
by the Law Number 13 the Year 2012 on Special Status of  Yogyakarta. 
On the other hand, the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran in Solo had 
a rather less significant role in the struggle for independence of  Indonesia. 
Instead of  fighting against the Dutch and joining with the Republicans, 
both Kingdoms preferred to maintain collaboration with the Dutch in 
order to secure political power. This was because both Kingdoms had 
to deal with contentious local socio-political development due to the 
severe rivalry between the two in the early 20th century. In this regard, 
both Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran formed civilian organizations of  
Pakempalan Kawoelo Soerokarto (PKS) and Pakempalan Kawoelo Mangkoe 
Negaran (PKMN) respectively in order to consolidate popular support that 
supposedly strengthens the legitimacy of  the leaders.12 Besides, the newly 
appointed Kings were having a leadership problem. The Pakubuwana 
XII and Mangkunegaran VIII who led Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran 
respectively during this turbulent time represented a poor character, lack 
of  leadership, and tend to be in favour of  supporting the Dutch.13
In addition to the conflict of  elites, the weakening Kasunanan and 
Mangkunegaran in Solo have also related to the anti-swapraja (Special 
Autonomy) movement organized by popular-based radical groups that 
challenged the political authority of  two kingdoms. The movement 
demanded to the Republic to vanishing the special status (Swapraja) in 
Solo through various ways such as mobilizing people gathering, signing 
the petition, pronouncing declaration, and kidnapping key figures of  
aristocrats.14 The turmoil and chaotic situations in the region had forced 
the Republic to suspend Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran political power 
11 Mohamad Roem et al., Tahta Untuk Rakyat: Celah-Celah Kehidupan Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2011), pp. 76–7.
12 George D. Larson, Masa Menjelang Revolusi: Keraton dan Kehidupan Politik di 
Surakarta, 1912-1942 (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990), pp. 263–5.
13 Ibid., p. 209; Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of  Revolution: Occupation and 
Resistance, 1944-1946 (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 347–56.
14 Julianto Ibrahim, Bandit dan Pejuang di Simpang Bengawan: Kriminalitas dan 
Kekerasan Masa Revolusi di Surakarta (Wonogiri: Bina Citra Pustaka, 2004), pp. 157–64.
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and eventually transformed them into ordinary Karesidenan (region) 
with the issuance of  Presidential Regulation (PP) No 16/SD/1946.15 
This had substantially signified the bankrupt of  political authority of  the 
Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. Therefore, in the post-independence 
Indonesia the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran in the City of  Solo did 
not have a special autonomy status, and indeed the role of  the Kingdoms 
was getting weak in the local politics and policy-making processes in the 
era of  the Republic of  Indonesia.
The above discussion has shown that socio-political and historical 
process led to different predominant-hegemonic power in the two royal 
cities of  Yogyakarta and Solo. In Solo, the Keraton has become less and 
less powerful, as the Indonesia nation-state developed. The Keraton of  
Solo (Kasunanan and Kasultanan) has a very limited legitimacy of  cultural 
and political authority.16 Conversely, the Keraton of  Yogyakarta has 
remained a key player in the State politics and policy-making since the very 
early period of  independence under the Old Order of  Sukarno (1945-
1966) to the New Order of  Suharto (1966-1998). In the Reformasi era 
(post-Suharto), it has received a Special Autonomy status that authorized 
the Sultan to also serve as a Governor, although there were groups that 
voiced up to demand democratic election for the Governor.  
Consequently, in the post-independence Indonesia, the Keraton of  
Yogyakarta has been able to embrace large cultural and political authority 
as a Sultan as well as a Governor. Meanwhile, the Kasunanan of  Surakarta 
and Mangkunegaran have limited authority in the realm of  culture and 
especially politics. Therefore, the special autonomy of  Yogyakarta has 
based on the fact that Yogyakarta has maintained its cultural symbolism 
of  Javanese culture and political roles in defending the nation-State 
of  Indonesia. In the period of  revolution, the Sultan was a respectful 
Republican. In the transitional period of  1965/66, the Sultan had also 
played a significant role in supporting the New Order of  Suharto that 
subsequently appointed him to serve as a Vice President of  Indonesia 
in 1973-1978. In the period of  the massive political reform in the late 
15 Ibid., p. 165.
16 G. Ambar Wulan Tulistyowati, “Perubahan Tata Pemerintahan dari Swapraja/
Daerah Istimewa menuju Karesidenan Surakarta Tahun 1945-1950”, Master’s Thesis 
(Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 2001).
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1990s, the Sultan HB X joined the crowd of  people and activists on the 
street in order to support the Reform movement.17
Furthermore, the hegemonic role in religio-cultural, political 
and economic field has placed the Keraton in a central position in 
Yogyakarta’s society. Sultan as the embodiment of  Keraton power has 
taken a significant role in any critical situation at the local as well as at the 
national level. For instance, during the political uncertainty and growing 
religious tensions after the collapse of  New Order in 1998, Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono X had been playing crucial role when he persuaded 
people to avoid anarchism and led enormous peaceful demonstrations 
in Yogyakarta.18 It was widely known that Yogyakarta became one of  the 
most peaceful cities during the political transition period. It also proved 
that the Sultan of  Yogyakarta was able to control its city dwellers from 
unrest and violence following the collapse of  the New Order in 1998. 
Contrary to this, Solo had experience of  urban riot and violence in May 
1998, few days before President Soeharto resigned from power.19 It 
reflected the limited social role and lack of  cultural legitimacy belongs 
to the Keraton of  Solo both on socio-cultural and political issues. The 
absence of  hegemonic cultural authority in Solo led to ‘direct contestation’ 
between secular-nationalist and Islamist forces in several public arenas 
in the city of  Solo as will be discussed in the next section.
C. Three Forms of  Intolerance Act
The difference of  historical and political trajectory has an impact 
on the forms of  contestation between Islamists and secular-nationalist 
groups in Yogyakarta and Solo. Yogyakarta was prominent as the city 
of  tolerance especially following the Sultanate’s influence in preventing 
mass riots during the political transition in late1990s. However, the story 
17 Woodward, Java, Indonesia and Islam.
18 Yustinus Tri Subagya, Support for Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia 
(Yogyakarta: Universitas Sanata Dharma, 2015), p. 45; S.R. Panggabean and B. Smith, 
“Explaining Anti-Chinese Riots in Late 20th Century Indonesia”, World Development, 
vol. 39, no. 2 (2011), pp. 231–42.
19 Lambang Trijono, “The Political-Economic Crises and Anti-Chinesse Riot: 
A case of  the May 1998 Solo Riot in Indonesia”, Master’s Thesis (Sydney: University 
of  Sydney, 2001).
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was reversed recently, at least in the last few years, signified by a sharp 
increase in intolerance attacks. The Wahid Institute reported that in 2014 
and 2015 Yogyakarta ranked the second largest intolerance incidents in 
Indonesia, just after the West Java Province. 
This paper argues that the repeated intolerance acts manifested 
not in a single form but a rather multiple, either symbolic, instrumental, 
or ideological. The actions are not always related to a transcendental 
orientation of  ‘serving God’ or purification of  religious meanings and 
teachings. Rather, multiple underpinning motives brought Islamists to 
commit intolerance forms of  action. Thus, intolerance actions can be 
symbolic, instrumental, and ideological form. This categorization is not 
fixed, clear-cut and permanent as there will be a possibility to shift from 
one form into another over different times and occasions. It should be 
noted here that there were several occasions in which the Islamists may 
utilize more than one form of  intolerance at the same time in order to 
pursue their different objective and to winning over different groups. 
1. Symbolic Intolerance
First of  all, the Islamists may take intolerance form of  action in 
order to promote group symbolism that expectedly acts as ‘master of  the 
signifier’20 and thus supposedly will unite or establish a common-bounded 
sentiment among the group members. In this regard, the symbolism has, 
in the eyes of  Islamists, corresponded to doctrines and teachings, or at 
the very least the morality, of  Islam. The production of  the symbolism 
may have no direct correlation or intention for materialistic gains. It 
reflected, for instance, in various events organized by the Islamists such 
as carnival, festivities, and patrols on the streets.
Symbolic intolerance refers to a reproduction of  symbolism that 
attaches to a particular constructed meanings and relates to a particular 
social context. It can be understood as an attempt to consolidate members 
of  groups as well as internal resources. Within this symbolic movement, 
the contestation was not only related to economics and politics but also 
20 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of  the Political (London: Verso, 1993); Chantal 
Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?”, Social Research, vol. 66, 
no. 3 (1999), pp. 745–58; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. by Winston Moore and Paul Cammack 
(London: Verso, 1985).
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related to meanings, symbols, values, and reconstruction over a particular 
social entity. This form of  intolerance frequently mobilizes an identity 
at both individual and societal intensively. 
Based on field observation in Yogyakarta and Solo, the symbolic 
form of  intolerance has manifested in the anti-Shia movement. The 
Shia community has actually long historical roots in Indonesian society 
as reflected in the existence of  Syiah-associated tradition across the 
archipelagic Indonesia such as the Tabot Festival in Bengkulu and the 
tradition of  red-rice porridge among the Javanese in a celebration of  the 
10th Muharram, a special day of  ceremonial amongst the Shi’ites 21. These 
local traditions have also proved evidence that the coming of  Shia to 
Indonesian archipelago used to accommodate local tradition and culture, 
although there was a tendency in the last decade that Shia has become 
more fiqh (religious law of  worship) oriented. Currently, there are two 
prominent Shia-related organizations in Indonesia, namely the Ikatan 
Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI) and the Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI). 
In Yogyakarta, the Islamist groups such as the FUI (the Forum 
of  Adherents of  Islam), MMI (the Indonesian Mujahedeen Assembly), 
FKAM (the Communication Forum of  Mosque Activists), FJI (the Forum 
of  Jihadists of  Islam), and other lascars have been actively campaigning 
against the Shia and Communism through various means of  movements 
such as public oration, seminar, patrol, and demonstration. For instance, 
the event of  31 May 2015 in Yogyakarta’s northern yard (Alun-alun Utara) 
was designed for anti-Shia gathering where a number of  prominent figures 
gave a speech to cautious public awareness about the ‘threat’ of  Shia. 
The main tagline of  the event was ‘Yogyakarta Without Shia.’ However, 
in the midst of  the crowd, the banners of  anti-shia have also flooded 
and used to present along with the banner of  ‘anti-Communists.’ In Solo, 
the movement of  anti-Shia has also attracted massive public attention. 
Here, the proponents of  anti-Shia movements were the Laskar Umat 
Islam Surakarta (LUIS), FKAM, and the Dewan Syariah Kota Surakarta 
(DSKS). They were actively organizing a campaign of  anti-Shia, including 
in the Tauhid Parade held on 16 May 2015. 
21 Chiara Formichi, “Shaping Shia Identities in Contemporary Indonesia 
between Local Tradition and Foreign Orthodoxy”, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 54, no. 2 
(2014), pp. 212–36.
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Despite to the huge masses mobilization in the anti-Shia 
demonstration, our research found that there were very insignificant 
numbers of  Shia members in Yogyakarta and Solo. Throughout several 
interviews with actors who involved in the campaign of  anti-shia, the 
movement actually had no clear targetted Shia groups. For instance, in 
Yogyakarta Shia is very insignificant in terms of  members as well as 
organizations. The most prominent associated-Shia is the Rausyan Fikr, 
a small group of  study and discussion particularly about philosophy 
and thoughts of  Shiah scholars. The organizations of  the IJABI (Ikatan 
Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia) and the ABI (Ahlul Bait Indonesia) were 
also unrecognized in Yogyakarta. In Solo, the anti-Shia movements have 
targetted Habib Rizieq, a central figure of  the Islamic Defender Front 
(FPI), and Ustadz Mudzakir, a charismatic scholar and leader of  the 
Pesantren Al-Gumuk with thousands of  Santri (Islamic students), as well 
as Ustadz Khairul, a respectable head of  the Solo FPI. The anti-Shia 
campaign also targeted Jose Rizal, a prominent activist of  a humanitarian 
non-government organization named MERCI. 
In addition to that, the symbolic dimension of  anti-Shia movement 
can also be found within the ‘raison de etre’ of  Islamist umbrella 
organization both in Solo and in Yogyakarta. The story of  how the DSKS 
came into existence is probably the best case for demonstrating anti-Shia 
dimension already exist long before the formation of  this organization. 
An influential head of  DSKS told us how the issue of  Shia had been one 
of  the main reasons for the establishment of  DSKS. He stated to us:
 “DSKS born to address the grievances and issues that cannot 
be answered by the established Islamic organizations such as MUI 
(Indonesian Ulama Council), Muhammadiyah as well as Nahdatul Ulama. 
For example, when the people ask about Shia, LDII, Ahmadiyah, and 
Others Deviant Sects within Islam, these established organizations (NU, 
Muhammadiyah, and MUI) cannot provide an answer. It is precisely the 
role of  DSKS in addressing these issues to the Umat.”22
It should be obvious how the discourse of  anti-Shia—then 
transformed into the movement of  anti-Shia—has been ‘the genetic’ of  
DSKS since the very beginning. In this regard, Shia is considered as the 
symbolism of  ‘deviant sect’ that threatened ‘pure Islam’ along with LDII 
22 Sukino, interview (19 Aug 2015).
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and Ahmadiyah. In rather similar case, in Yogyakarta, the discourse of  
anti-Shia has been one of  the main concerns of  Forum Umat Islam (FUI), 
an Islamist umbrella organization. Fuad Andreago, a prominent young 
figure of  the FUI said that “Shia along with LGBT and communism 
could not be tolerated at all in Yogyakarta.” 
Based on the above, this research argues that the anti-Shia 
mobilization in Yogyakarta and Solo is not necessarily rooted in the global 
narrative of  theological-ideological conflict between the Sunni and the 
Shia.23 Rather, it aimed to draw a symbolism as a ‘master of  signifier’ 
that would strengthen a sense of  internal group membership.24 It has 
functioned to reconsolidate the Islamists and differentiate them from 
the nationalists in both Yogyakarta and Solo.
2. Instrumental Intolerance
The intolerance form of  actions can also be instrumental in order 
to gain economic and political advantages amidst contested resources 
of  politics and economy. Here, the Islamists were employing forms 
of  intolerance actions as an instrument to gain political and economic 
benefits following heightened contestation especially between the 
Islamist and the nationalist groups in democratizing Indonesia. Various 
forms of  mass mobilization, i.e., parade, demonstration, and violence 
attacks became an instrument to push political and economic bargain 
over the rival group. It confirms the argument of  collective action that 
takes shape in the resource mobilization approach of  social movement 
theory.25 The resource mobilization has become a substantial element 
in collective action to gain support from constituencies as well as to 
strengthen pressure over the rival groups. 
This research found a number of  cases where Islamists contested 
and indeed be in conflict with their rival nationalists regarding, for instance, 
control over parking areas, business and trading, and constituencies. In 
23 Nathan Gonzalez, The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the 
Middle East (New York: Nortia Press, 2009).
24 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
25 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory”, American Journal of  Sociology, vol. 82, no. 6 (1977), pp. 
1212–41.
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this regard, both the Islamists and the nationalists reproduced narratives 
and form of  actions as an intrument to contest one-another in order to 
win control over a particular political and economic resource. Intolerance 
form of  the action takes place within a process to secure resources that 
are crucial for maintaining existence and sustainability of  the organization. 
Indeed, control over the resource is also meaningfully important for 
the group to maintain bargaining position amidst highly contested local 
power. The field of  politics and economic are the major contested arena 
between the Islamists and their counterpart of  nationalists. In regard 
to politics, both contesting groups are attempting to push their agenda 
through both formal structure and non-formal processes. 
Yogyakarta and Solo have similarities in certain contested fields. In 
Solo, the major field of  political contestation is related to electoral politics 
of  Head of  the District. Here, the nationalists of  PDIP (Indonesian 
Democratic Party of  Struggle) almost always won the Executive Head 
election in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Since the Reformasi to 2014 
election, but the 2004 election, the PDIP always got the majority votes 
both in Legislative and Executive Elections. Thus, the nationalist PDIP 
has been very dominant and indeed determinant in the local politics of  
Solo in the post-Suharto era. As has been discussed above, the PDIP has 
successfully controlled the local executive office with a significant vote, 
for instance, in 2011 when the PDI-supported candidates of  Jokowi and 
FX Rudi were re-elected for the Local Executive Head with a fantastic 
vote of  90,09 percent. 
Although the Islamist politics has never won the election, it does 
not mean that they are insignificant in local politics of  Solo. It had long 
historical roots in the pre-independence Indonesia when Solo had become 
a head-quarter of  the Red Sarekat Islam led by Haji Misbah.26 This has left 
a trace to the current profile of  Solo Islamists that seem to have strong 
militancy among its members, although the actual members are quite 
small.  The strong militancy of  Islamist groups in Solo has been nurtured 
by the birth of  several radical Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Solo 
areas, such as Pesantren of  Ngruki and Pesantren of  Gumuk. With their 
militancy, the political Islamists frequently challenge the domination 
26 Takashi Shiraishi, Zaman Bergerak: Radikalisme Rakyat di Jawa 1912-1926 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1997).
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of  the nationalist politics of  the PDIP. In 2015 election for Executive 
Head, for instance, the Islamist politics established a coalition consisted 
of  PAN, PKS, and PPP with the secular-developmentalist parties of  the 
Golkar, Demokrat, and Gerindra to support Anung Indri and Fajri as 
a candidate for the Executive Head. This had proven that the Islamists 
had successfully established a coalition with other parties in order to 
challenge the domination of  the PDIP, although at the end of  the day 
they still failed to win the election for the Executive Office. 
Religious issues have became a mobilizing sentiment employed 
by the Islamists in order to consolidate internal group members (within 
the Islamists parties and constituencies) as reflected in the ‘Parade 
Tauhid’ that attracted major elements of  Islam in Solo such as the NU, 
Muhammadiyah, Islamic Student Association (HMI), Union of  University 
Student of  Muhamadiyah (IMM), KAMMI, MMI, FPI, HTI, Tarbiyah, 
MTA, LUIS, Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang, FKAM, and DSKS. There 
were about 100.000 people (as it was claimed by several Islamist media) 
participated in the Parade Tauhid.27 Indeed, as it had mobilized huge 
masses on the street, the Parade Tauhid had eventually attracted non-
Islamist local elite, i.e., the Prince of  Wirabumi of  the Surakarta Sultanate 
and the former incumbent Vice Mayor of  Solo, Mr. Achmad Purnomo, 
in order to re-claiming political influence and to winning the heart of  
Islamic constituencies. The appearance of  the Prince Wirabumi and Vice 
Mayor of  Solo might also demonstrate the importance of  this event and 
the recognition of  Islamist’s militancy and networks. Moreover, broad 
participation in the Parade Tauhid had also coincided with spreading 
perception among the Islamists that the running candidate of  PDIP, FX 
Rudi, during his first term service in the Local Executive has been very 
much in favour of  the Christian groups. 
Therefore, the emergence of  Islamist symbolism like one in the 
Parade Tauhid can be seen as a form of  the instrumentation of  Islam-
related symbolism in order to maintain supports and loyalty amongst 
the constituents for the sake of  winning a local election. In addition, 
27 See for example the news in Panjimas.org telling and presenting the pictures of  
the Tauhid Parade participated by more than a hundred thousand muslims as published 
at “Galeri Foto Ratusan Ribu Umat Islam Banjiri Parade Tauhid di Solo”, Panjimas 
(18 May 2015), https://www.panjimas.com/galeri/photos/2015/05/18/galeri-foto-
ratusan-ribu-umat-islam-banjiri-parade-tauhid-di-solo/, accessed 5 Oct 2016.
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intolerance acts can also be a manifestation of  economic contestation 
over controlling parking areas, for instance, between the ‘Green militia’ 
and the ‘Red militia’ associated to the Islamist Party of  the PPP and the 
nationalist PDIP respectively. The rivalry between these two groups has 
a very long rooted in Yogyakarta. It is almost always related to a conflict 
over controlling a territory of  business. Besides, as they are affiliated 
to different political parties, the two groups are frequently involved in 
conflict and violence during the campaign of  a political election. The 
Forum Umat Islam (FUI), has aware that economic resources are very 
substantial for the sustenance of  their organization. Therefore, through 
their affiliated organizations such as the Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (GPK) 
and Muslim Green Zone, they keep maintaining control over parking 
business, security service, and tourism transportation service situated in 
the heart of  Yogyakarta. Several members of  GPK in Yogyakarta have 
also played a role as ‘debt collector’.28 In Solo, a lot of  parking areas in 
the main roads are controlled by the nationalist thugs affiliated to PDIP, 
and the most serious challenger for PDIP’s domination over parking areas 
comes from the Islamist militias as stated by Sukino, a Vice Chairman 
of  DSKS. Several clash and incidents between the nationalist thugs and 
Islamist-militias that have occurred in Solo’s recently demonstrate how 
the nationalist and the Islamist have been fighting each other in order 
to secure lucrative economic resource from parking areas and security 
provision.
3. Ideological Intolerance
Last but not least, ideology has also driven intolerance expression 
in public in Yogyakarta and Solo. It refers to a form of  actions rooted in 
ideological contestation between contesting social groups. Here Islamism 
is defined as an ideology since it is a system of  ideas about how the world 
works with ethical, moral, and normative principles that guide personal 
and collective action.29 The ideological contestation often embodied in 
28 Diatyka Widya, “Tradisi, Ekonomi-Politik, dan Toleransi”, MASYARAKAT 
Jurnal Sosiologi, vol. 15, no. 2 (2010), p. 53.
29 Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston, “What a Good Idea! Ideologies and 
Frames in Social Movement Research”, Mobilization: An International Quarterly, vol. 5, 
no. 1 (2000), p. 44.
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historical narratives within a society that has provided a short of  values 
reference amongst members of  particular groups. Ideology consists of  
‘truth claim’ over particular social and political issues and events, i.e., the 
1965 coup de tat and its following massacres. The movement of  against 
communism, for instance, has almost always effectively mobilized Islamist 
groups to take patrol or violent attack to group considered as proponents, 
or at least sympathizers, of  the PKI as they were considered responsible 
for the coup de tat and massacres of  1965. 
The issue of  the threat of  communism has almost always effectively 
mobilized Islamist groups, with commonly got supports from the army 
groups, to go to the street and fight against any forms of  symbolic-
associated to communism or groups that considered as proponents 
of  the ideology of  Communism. Tension over communism narrative 
has rooted in Indonesian history especially back to the coup de tat 
of  1965. Since then, Communism and Communists—associated to 
the PKI members—have become an ‘enemy of  the State’ reflected in 
overwhelmed State’s campaigned to against Communism during the New 
Order regime (1966-1998).30 In short, the anti-communism has strongly 
associated to the agenda of  State regime to reproduce State ideology of  
Pancasila at the national level and the political and economic interest 
during the Cold War at the global.31
The collapse of  New Order regime in 1998, however, had an 
insignificant impact on weakening ideologization of  anti-communism, 
especially amongst the Islamists and the army. Nowadays, communism 
remains considered as a threat to both the ideology of  the State—
among them the army—and the ideology of  theism—among them, 
the Islamists. In this regard, during 2013 alone, there were numbers of  
violent attacks under the anti-communism narrative in Yogyakarta such 
as forced expulsion by the Front Anti Komunis Indonesia (FAKI) over 
the meeting of  ex-political prisoners associated to the 1965 revolt held in 
the Shanti Dharma, Sleman, Yogyakarta. FAKI is an alliance of  various 
30 Wijaya Herlambang, Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru 
Melegitimasi Anti-Komunisme melalui Sastra dan Film (Serpong: Marjin Kiri, 2013).
31 Vedi R. Hadiz, “The Left and Indonesia’s 1960s: The Politics of  Remembering 
and Forgetting”, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 7, no. 4 (2006), pp. 554–69; Ariel Heryanto, 
State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging (London: Routledge, 2005).
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organizations that having similar orientation and agenda to fighting 
against communism in Yogyakarta. 
The heightened tensions were related to the screening of  the 
2014 film of  the Look of  Silence by Joshua Oppenheimer that eventually 
led to a number of  intolerance acts and violence. In Yogyakarta, the 
screening of  the film in Gadjah Mada University and the Indonesian 
Institute of  Art (ISI) was forced to cancel by Islamist vigilantes of  the 
FUI. The FUI militia has also intimidated the screening of  it in the State 
University of  Islam. Besides, the FUI militia had also forced the Social 
Movement Institue, a local NGO, to stop screening the International 
People’s Tribunal (IPT) about Human Right violation in 1965 incident 
held in Den Haag Netherland. 
Meanwhile, the winning of  FX Rudi in the 2015 election of  the City 
Mayor of  Solo has also been perceived by the Islamists as a symptom of  
Communism awakening as stated by Zainal, chairman of  MUI in Solo 
in an interview on 23 Sept 2015. As discussed above, the contentious 
relationship between the Islamists and the Communists has had long 
roots in Solo, i.e., the fantastic victory of  PKI in 1955 election32 and 
the stronghold of  nationalist parties before the fusion policy of  1977. 
In the view of  the Islamists, the proponents of  the PKI had swung to 
the PDI following the fusion policy and later to PDIP in the Reformasi 
era. With this in mind, the reproduction of  ‘anti-communism’ has 
gained local relevance and indeed resonance in Solo as it has a linkage 
to local contestation between the minority but militant Islamists and the 
predominant nationalists of  the PDIP. In this regard, Communism has 
been perceived as a threat, not only to the national ideology of  the State 
but also to the religiosity of  the people. 
The above narratives demonstrated the resurgence of  social tensions 
at the local had been underpinned by sharp ideological contestation. The 
narrative of  anti-communism has been rooted in the historical legacy 
of  the mid 20th century political and ideological rivalry in Indonesian. 
Yet under the democratizing post-Suharto Indonesia, the ideological 
battle has been revived along with heightened political contestation. The 
32 Herbert Feith, Indonesian Elections of  1955 (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia 
Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of  Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University., 
1957).
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Islamist forces believe that the ‘New Type of  Communism’ (Komunis 
Gaya Baru) has been reviving across the archipelago reflected, among 
others, in the political victory of  PDIP, the massive campaign of  the 
‘leftist’ ideology, and attempts of  redefining the ‘1965 tragedy’ through 
the 1965 People Tribunal took place in the Hague, The Netherlands, in 
November 2015. 
D. The Interlink of  the Three Forms of  Intolerance
As previously suggested, the delineation of  the three forms of  
intolerance above should not be understood as a clear-cut and rigid 
categorization. The following section will discuss and demonstrate 
how these three forms of  intolerance might intertwine each other in 
Yogyakarta and Solo. 
One of  the most striking cases of  how these three forms of  
intolerance might overlap with one another is the case of  ‘Tauhid 
Parade’ in Solo. As discussed earlier, the ‘Tauhid Parade’ was a form of  
instrumentalization of  Islam-related symbolism to win local political 
contestation in Solo. Nevertheless, the ‘Tauhid Parade’ can also be 
understood as ‘symbolic intolerance’ regarding its capacity to consolidate 
and unite various Islamic organizations and constituencies in Solo. A 
hundred of  people that attended this parade brought a banner with 
the length of  2.5 Kilometer written the sentence of  Laa Ilaha Illa Allah 
(No God but Allah) went around the City of  Solo. It was an Islamists’ 
response to the “Salib Parade” (the Cross parade) held by Christians three 
weeks before in the City of  Solo that mobilized around 15,000 people 
with 270 massive wood crusades were shouldered by the youth Christian 
militias on the streets.33 The ‘Salib Parade’ was organized by the networks 
of  the church in Solo, and more than 1200 participants attended it. In 
this regard, both ‘Tauhid Parade’ and ‘Salib Parade’ were a reflection of  
symbolism contestation between Islam and Christian forces. Tauhid is 
the most central tenet and the most important concept of  Islam, it is the 
basis of  all Muslim beliefs. While the Christian cross is a representation 
of  the crucifixion of  Jesus; it is the best-known of  Christian symbolism. 
33 See for example the news in Panjimas.org telling and presenting the pictures of  
the Tauhid Parade participated by more than a hundred thousand muslims as published 
at “Galeri Foto Ratusan Ribu Umat Islam Banjiri Parade Tauhid di Solo”.
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This ‘symbolic contestation’ was perhaps best reflected in the statement 
of  KH. Wahyudin, the head of  Islamic boarding school (Pesantren) of  
Al Mukmin Ngruki that involved in the ‘Parade Tauhid.’ He said that 
‘Muslims in Solo need a supplement after the previous mass mobilization 
in the Salib Parade. So, we expect Muslims in Solo do not become inferior 
after the ‘Salib Parade’ happened.’34 For the Islamists, it was obvious that 
the ‘Tauhid Parade’ was utilized for bolstering the spirit and raising the 
confidence of  Muslims in Solo after the ‘Salib Parade’ took place. In 
addition to that, the success story of  ‘Tauhid Parade’ in consolidating 
Islamic constituencies inspired Islamist networks in other cities to conduct 
such an event.35  
Another example is the anti-Shia movement. As discussed earlier, 
the anti-Shia campaign in both cities should be understood as a symbolic 
form of  intolerance due to its function to consolidate and to unite various 
Islamist constituencies. However, the anti-Shia mobilization in some 
cases has related to the contestation over political resources and sphere 
of  influence. For instance, in Yogyakarta, the anti-Shia alliance organized 
a public discussion of  book entitled Mengenal dan Mewaspadai Bahaya Syiah 
di Indonesia (Recognizing and Caution of  the Threat of  Shia in Indonesia) 
followed by the declaration of  the Masyarakat Pecinta Sunnah (Sunnah 
Lover Society) in UGM’s mosque in 2013 that was led by the regent of  
Sleman, Sri Purnomo. This event was organized by Jama’ah Shalahuddin 
UGM and supported by several Islamist groups. The event should not 
only be viewed as ‘symbolic intolerance’ since it brought various Islamist 
groups to unite, but also it can be seen as ‘instrumental intolerance’ by 
Islamists and local elites since the attendance of  Sleman’s Regent, Sri 
Purnomo, who attempted to run for the second period of  the Executive 
Head Office in the upcoming regional election in 2015. From this point 
of  view, his attendance and his support for the anti-Shia campaign was 
an attempt to win the heart of  Islamist constituencies to vote for him 
in the election. 
34 See “KH Wahyudin: Saya Dukung Parade Tauhid, Agar Umat Islam Tidak 
Minder dengan Adanya Parade Salib”, Panjimas (18 May 2015), https://www.panjimas.
com/news/2015/05/18/kh-wahyudin-saya-dukung-parade-tauhid-agar-umat-islam-
tidak-minder-dengan-adanya-parade-salib/, accessed 7 Oct 2016.
35 Sukino, interview (19 Aug 2015).
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In slightly different case, the anti-Shia campaign in Solo was 
also related to the contestation of  the sphere of  influence within the 
Islamist groups themselves. The campaign of  anti-Shia that targeted 
prominent and charismatic ulama in Solo, i.e., Ustadz Muzakir the leader 
of  Pesantren Al-Islam Gumuk can be seen as the contestation within 
the Islamist themselves. Anti-Shia accusations toward several prominent 
Islamist figures in Solo have frequently accompanied by the background 
of  personal intrigues, conflict of  interest, and the contest for influence 
among Islamist constituencies. For example, the Chairman of  PBB (Star 
and Crescent Party), an Islamist party, in Solo confirmed that when he 
was running for a regional legislative seat in the 2014 election, he was 
attacked and accused by his rivals as a Shia proponent during the campaign 
period to lowering votes form the constituencies. Thus, in some cases in 
Solo and Yogyakarta, the anti-Shia campaign should be regarded both as 
‘symbolic’ as well as ‘instrumental’ form of  intolerance. 
Anti-Shia campaign in the two cities also reflects the dynamic 
interplay between global, national, and local dimension within the three 
forms of  intolerance. The changing dynamic of  the global, national, and 
local might lead to the shifting from one to another type of  intolerance. 
Anti-Shia campaign is probably the best case for illustrating it. Anti-Shia 
campaign has different global, national, and local contexts that shape its 
expressions and forms of  intolerance. Although the division and schism 
between Shia and Sunni Muslim can be traced into the dispute over 
Muslim leadership immediately after the Prophet Mohammed’s death 
in the sixth century, it is hard to deny that the rising tide of  anti-Shia 
campaign in the recent time has originated in the geopolitical rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran particularly after the Iranian revolution in 
1979. It was exacerbated by the recent political dynamics in the Middle 
East such as Syria and Yemen civil war in which Saudi Arabia and Iran 
took a different stand among the conflicting parties. Within this struggle 
for power and influence in the Middle East, the resurgence of  anti-Shia 
campaign and sectarianism sentiment has much to do with the battle for 
power, resources, and territory.36 
36 Ian Black, “Sunni v Shia: Why the conflict is more political than religious”, The 
Guardian (5 Apr 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/05/sunni-shia-
why-conflict-more-political-than-religious-sectarian-middle-east, accessed 20 Jan 2018.
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 Surprisingly, this anti-Shia campaign has been echoed by the 
Islamists in Indonesia. However, it took different forms of  tension 
shaped by the national and local dynamics. For instance, in Yogyakarta, 
the Islamists were always promoting that Shia is the ‘enemy’ for the 
national integration as well as Indonesian’s Muslim ummah as stated by 
Fuad Andreago, a Commander of  Youth Islamist Lascar of  Yogyakarta 
in the interview on 19 June 2015. They were pointing out the political 
dynamics in the Middle East portraying the expanding role and sphere of  
influence of  Iran. According to them, Indonesia is under threat of  Iran-
led Shia expansion. Thus, they have to defend and to keep Indonesia as 
‘the Sunni country.’ As has been mentioned before, an act of  intolerance 
can be in the  form of  symbolic intolerance that functioning as solidarity 
maker to unite various Islamic constituencies. Meanwhile, the anti-Shia 
campaign has also a political dimension both in Yogyakarta and Solo as 
reflected in the anti-Shia declaration attended by the Regent of  Sleman 
who was running for the next term and the anti-Shia campaign that 
targeted prominent Islamist figures in Solo. Accordingly, it was evident 
that anti-Shia campaign reflects the shifting of  intolerance form shaped 
by the global and national-local dynamics, from a kind of  instrumental 
manoeuvres in the geopolitical rivalry between the Saudi and Iran to the 
symbolic intolerance among the Islamist at the national and local level 
in Indonesia.
The narratives above demonstrate that the three forms of  
intolerance may intertwine each other and there are possibilities that 
the Islamist can utilize more than one strategy to win over different 
constituencies and objectives.   
E. Concluding Remarks
The narratives from Yogyakarta and Solo have provided evidence 
that the structure of  power relations has a significant role in the 
insurgence of  Islamist intolerance in both cities. The difference of  
historical and political trajectory in the two cities shapes difference forms 
of  networks, expressions, and the contentious relationship between the 
Islamists and the nationalists. The paper argues that Islamist intolerance 
has multiple and dynamic forms. Islamist intolerance can be manifested 
in ideological, instrumental, and symbolic forms. It should be stressed 
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again that these categorizations are not clear-cut and rigid since these 
three forms of  intolerance might overlap with one another over different 
events and occasions. They can also shift from one dimension into 
another following changing dynamic either at local, national, or global 
level. These three forms of  intolerance flourished in the ‘contested’ and 
‘limited’ socio-political space. They competed for each other in capturing 
meanings, identities, symbolism, and political-economic resources albeit 
their expressions and interests were tied and intertwined complexly. As 
has been discussed throughout this paper, in the courses of  dynamics 
of  social and political practices at the local, the contesting Islamists and 
the nationalists might be engaged in a particular moment of  articulation 
and disengaged in the other. 
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